This paper presents a hierarchical architecture for integrated guidance and control that achieves risk and cost reduction for NASA's 2 "dgeneration reusable launch vehicle (RLV).
Introduction
Flight mechanics technology is perhaps of the highest abstraction in an RLV system in the sense that, unlike hardware and software, it is algorithmic in nature. In fact, the evolution of space exploration and exploitation has been a major driving force for the development of modern G&C theory and technology. In turn, the flourish of modern G&C theory in the late 50's and early 60's had rewarded the aerospace community with an enabling technology that contributed to the success of Apollo moon landings and routine space flight by the 1st generation RLV, viz. the Space Shuttle.
It has been so successful that, during the more than 100 Shuttle flights to date, there has not been an LOV or LOC incident caused by guidance or control.
However, the success of Shuttle G&C technology comes at the price of stringent launch and entry windows that lead to excessive launch and entry rescheduling. The large number of I-loads and the difficulty in validating guidance and control gains for a particular mission contribute significantly to the high operational cost of the Shuttle. This is especially true when this technology is applied to the more challenging 2 "d generation RLV architectures. The Shuttle G&C technology has two major deficiencies. First, the G&C algorithms are gain-scheduled which, albeit may give good performance under nominal conditions, create large I-loads, and are difficult and time consuming to design, tune and validate, yet not very robust in off nominal flight conditions. Second, it lacks autonomous control reconfiguration and abort guidance. Another problem that is common to most if not all G&C subsystems is the segregated guidance and control design approach, which limits the performance and robustness of the overall G&C subsystem. These problems contribute significantly to the high risk and cost of Shuttle operation.
During the recent X-33 advanced G&C (AG&C) research program at NASA MSFC, the MSFC baseline G&C algorithms along with several alternative G&C algorithms developed in-house or by contractors were tested with high fidelity 6-DOF Monte Carlo dispersion simulations under realistic flight conditions [1] . [10] .
A hybrid systems approach holdssignificantpotentialto aid in the analysis, design, and simulationphasesof IG&C technologydevelopment.For example,hierarchical architectures are often necessary in orderto managecomplexityin large-scale systems [9] . Variouslayersin thehierarchyaredesigned basedon courseor aggregated models of lower level subsystems. Here it is crucial that aggregationis performedin a hierarchicallyconsistent fashion,whichessentially meansthatconstraints of lower level subsystems are adequately reflectedin any simplifiedmodelso that high-levelpolicies meetinghigh level objectivesdo not violate low-levelconstraints.The highestlevel in the hierarchyis often purelylogical in natureandmodeledby a discreteeventsystem. Thetheoryof discrete-event systems is now fairly matureandtoolsfor analysis, design, testing, andoptimizationarewidelyavailable [3] .
Autocommander

-Functional Description
The autocommander is expected to autonomously perform three main high-level functions: (i) to act as mission manager under nominal conditions, (ii) to reconfigure the G&C subsystems under off-nominal conditions for improved fault tolerance, and (iii) to declare an appropriate abort mode in the event of an unrecoverable failure in coordination with on-line trajectory re-planning. The interrelationships between these main operational modes are captured in the high-level diagram in Figure 2 . Currently absent from this figure is an indication of the mechanisms that cause appropriate transitions between these modes or states.
It is clear even at this level of detail that equipping the autocommander with the necessary algorithms to distill information from various sources into decision-making logic and associated actions is a considerable challenge.
Figure 2 Autocommander top-level logical diagram
To meet this challenge, a key goal of the autocommander effort is the development of 
G&C Reconfiguration
Suppose that for different flight regimes the control effectors are designated as primary or secondary depending on their effectiveness and the desirability for using them. These designations are to be made during control allocation design and captured in the master database. Using the tools under development,the databaseinformation will be transformed into a discreteeventsystem modelgivenby anautomaton of the formshown in Figure 4 • Abort Once Around (AOA): the vehicle will fly around the earth once in order to better target a desired abort landing site, including the launch site or landing sites that are to the west of the launch site. The AOA is used when the MECO energy level does not allow the vehicle to reach the ATO orbit. Similar to ATO, the AOA consists of a number of submodes depending on the number of engine failure modes that have distinct effects on flight mechanics and the number of available landing sites.
• Down Range Abort (DRA): the vehicle will fly a sub orbital entry trajectory targeted at a landing site other than, and to the east of the launch site. (For this reason, it is also known as Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) for the Space Shuttle, which is routinely launched from the east coast.) The DRA is used when either the MECO energy level or vehicle condition does not allow the vehicle to fly once around, or when the desired time-to-landing is less than an hour. The submodes for DRA are a combination of the number of distinct engine failure modes and all alternative landing sites.
• Return to Launch Site (RTLS) Abort: during early stage of ascent, the vehicle may return to the launch site if an abort is necessary. The RTLS abort window exists from lifloff until the Negative Return (NE) time when the vehicle energy level and remaining fuel are such that RTLS maneuvers cannot be completed. The RTLS abort affords the shortest time-to-landing.
The submodes for RTLS depend on the number of distinct engine failure modes.
Since each of the abort modes depends on the attainable energy level, which in turn depends mainly on the vehicle MECO velocity (since potential energy is negligible comparing to kinetic energy during launch), the window for each abort mode comes sequentially from liftoff with RTLS first, followed by DRA, AOA and ATO. Associated with each abort (sub) mode, there is a risk factor and a cost factor.
These factors may vary with the vehicle condition and environmental conditions. For example, thermal stress during entry increases with the vehicle energy level. Thus, the risk factor would increase for a vehicle with thermal protection damage. However, from the flight control point of view, the risk factor decreases with the RTLS-DRA-AOA-ATO sequence, as the entry maneuvers will be less demanding with higher energy level at MECO. If the timeto-landing is of first priority, then the cost factor increases with the RTLS-DRA-AOA-ATO sequence. Otherwise, the cost factor may depend on whether the mission can be partially carried out, as may be the case with ATO, or the cost associated with each abort landing site.
In addition to the above intact abort scenarios, there may be cases where the vehicle system failure poses eminent danger to the crew or ground assets, or no feasible abort trajectories can be found.
In these cases, the first priority is to fly the vehicle to a safe condition to bail out the crew. Once the crew is safely bailed out, the vehicle will either fly autonomously under the autocommander's control, or remotely controlled by the Ground Mission Control (GMC) to a safe location for possible unmanned landing or intentional crash/splash landing. The crash site should be selected to minimize loss of ground assets, minimize the damage to the vehicle or to facilitate recovery of the vehicle wreckage.
The following figure depicts the concept for the Autonomous Abort Automaton, where each node should be understood as representing a set of discrete states. Each state has a preloaded risk factor and cost factor that can be updated by the autocommander during flight based on vehicle conditions, flight phases, current weather conditions, etc. These factors can also be updated by the Crew in flight. These factors will be used by the autocommander in optimizing abort decisions. The events and conditions that trigger an abort can be categorized into four classes:
• Example events of each type and how they may be combined in selection of an abort strategy using an automaton are given in the Tables below. It is emphasized here that in general these events are vehicle or mission dependent. VO  V1  V2  V3  V4  V5  V6  V7  V8  V9  VIO  VII  V12 V13 Vn Vehicle healthy, with confidence level Main avionics cooling system down (still have backup)
Table3. Example TypeV Eventsof Launch Abort
Events Description
Main power bus down (still have backup) Cabin decompression, with level of severity Failure of one (say, out of five) flight computers Failure of two (out of five) flight computers One (say, out of three) engine out Two (out of three) engines out Three (out of three) engines out Thermal protection defects, with level of severity Eminent danger to Crew (vehicle may still be landable autonomously) Crew has bailed out Catastrophic vehicle system failure (intact abort negative) Eminent danger to ground assets Etc. 
P8
P9 Pn
Description
Nominal orbit reachable with remaining fuel at current energy level, with confidence level (risk factor = 0) An alternative orbit (min. 24-hour stay) is reachable with remaining fuel at current energy level, with confidence level and risk factor Predicted MECO energy level allows for flying once around, with confidence level and risk factor Launch site is reachable with available energy and vehicle maneuverability, with confidence level and risk factor Landing site A is reachable with predicted MECO energy level and crossrange, with confidence level and risk factor Landing site B is reachable with predicted MECO energy level and crossrange, with confidence level and risk factor Landing site C is reachable with predicted MECO energy level and crossrange, with confidence level and risk factor Landing site D is reachable with predicted MECO energy level and crossrange, with confidence level and risk factor Crew bailout window available, with confidence level and risk factor Crew bailout window open, with confidence level and risk factor Etc.
Note:
1. The risk factors are evaluated based on the difficulty and mechanical/thermal stress of the required maneuvers for the trajectory, and the predicted weather conditions along the traiector _ and at the landing site. 
3.
The Type O events can be set by the Crew, or influenced by the crew by adjusting the acceptance threshold. The Events O0, O1 and 02 are mutually exclusive. When only one abort option exists, 06 is automatically set. When multiple abort options exist, the autocommander will make a decision using the built-in optimization algorithms. However, this decision may be overridden by the Crew or the GMC. The "&" is the logical AND operator, "t" is the logical OR operator, and "!" is the logical NOT operator. Figure 6 . This is a particularly important feature of Stateflow that allows the autocommander to be separated into different automata.
As shown in Figure 6, Figure 7 shows a generated Stateflow chart and the input and output ports that are generated by the autocoder within a simulation model. In addition to generating the Stateflow chart, wireless connection blocks (goto and from blocks) are generated to provide a plug and play capability for the generated chart.
Another key aspect of Stateflow is that when a transition occurs and/or while in a state (entry, during, exit and on event) actions can be implemented.
Actions may consist of the setting of flags, function calls, variable definitions, and broadcast events, etc. Not only do these actions provide the means for Stateflow to interact with Simulink and Matlab, but also provide the underlying structure and power of Stateflow. 
Conclusions
With the goal of developing a crosscutting technology for autonomous mission management, G&C reconfiguration, and abort management, our approach is to formulate a generic discrete event driven hybrid control system architecture that will capture the broad knowledge of the IVHM, Flight Mechanics, Flight Control and Flight Operation engineers and designers pertaining to nominal flight regime transition events, G&C reconfiguration events, abort triggering events, and optimization criteria for abort strategy selection based on confidence levels and consequences of the events. The autocommander architecture will include a database with Graphical User Interface (GUI)
for the domain engineers to specify the discrete event states and events along with their attributes for constructing the automata together with built in optimization algorithms for abort decision-making. Although the autocommander architecture is mainly for onboard operation, vehicle status display, OPP simulation, and the DFTC, it can also be used during the developmental phase and mission preparation to verify and optimize the abort logic and decision algorithms, and during flight phase by the GMC with additional computational power to perform more accurate and extensive contingency analysis.
